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Latin America and the Financial 
Crisis of 2008: Lessons and 
Challenges 
Dr. Luisa Blanco* 
ABSTRACT 
 
In October of 2008 there were two main views of what the financial 
crisis would do to emerging countries in Latin America.  The optimistic 
view predicted that they would do well overall and that the crisis would not 
have a significant impact on them because their economies were decoupled 
from the rest of the world.  The pessimistic view saw these economies as 
vulnerable to the financial crisis, which meant they would become unstable 
and perform poorly.  Over a year later, the outcome is something in between.  
This article will explain the current state of the financial crisis in Latin 
America and the policy responses of various Latin American countries.  
Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, will be highlighted because they present very 
interesting cases.  These examples are important when discussing lessons 
and challenges in Latin America.  The idea is to focus on what these Latin 
American countries have done that has allowed them to perform relatively 
well during the crisis, and discuss what challenges policy makers in the 
region are facing today and will face in the future. 
I.  THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON LATIN AMERICA 
 
Four pieces of macroeconomic data illustrate the impact of the financial 
crisis in Latin America: levels of gross domestic product (GDP), foreign 
trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and remittances.  World Bank 
projections from September 2009 estimate a 2% GDP decrease on average 
for the region for the year of 2009.1  Mexico, however, is a different case; its 
GDP is expected to decrease by about 7% in 2009.2  The Latin American 
experience during the crisis is quite heterogeneous, because some countries 
did not experience contractions (Bolivia, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay), some 
experienced miniature contractions (Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican 
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Republic), and others saw large contractions (Mexico).  It is very important 
economically for Latin America that the financial crisis did not originate 
there, as it did in previous financial crises.  Compared to other regions, Latin 
America was certainly not the hardest hit.  Projections estimate that Western 
Europe’s GDP will contract by 4.1%, Eastern Europe’s by 5.4%, and Japan’s 
by 5.7%.3  The projection for the U.S. is similar to the Latin American 
region, around 3%.4 
There are three main factors, using current data from the Organisation 
for Co-operation and Development (OECD)5, which affect the well being of 
Latin America.  One is that there was a significant reduction in world trade 
in the first quarter of 2009, but in the second quarter world trade started to 
stabilize.6  There was a significant decrease in exports from non-OECD 
countries in the first quarter of 2009.  One should focus on non-OECD 
exports, since most Latin American countries are not members of the OECD.  
The second quarter however, saw an increase of 1%, indicating some 
stabilization7.  Some project that the level of exports in Latin American 
countries reached bottom, so future growth may be approaching.  The level 
of non-OECD imports from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter 
of 2009 indicates some stabilization, or even future growth.  In 2008, exports 
in non-OECD countries decreased by about 2% in the third quarter and 4% 
in the fourth quarter.8  It is not all bad news. Exports actually increased from 
the first quarter to the second in 2009. 
Data from the United States is important for Latin America because 
Latin American countries export much of their products to the United States.  
In 2009, there was a significant reduction in imports from the rest of the 
world into the United States, and especially from Latin America.  Monthly 
averages of United States imports from the world offer a grim picture.  From 
2008 to 2009, they fell by 28%.9  Imports also fell in 2001 due to that 
recession, but only by about 6%.  The monthly average of the available 
observations for Latin American countries shows a very similar picture.  
There was a drop during the recession of 2001 and a drop in the recession of 
2008, and the magnitude is greater now than it was then.10  Brazilian imports 
to the United States have increased significantly over time, but dropped 
precipitously during the current recession.  On the upside, they started 
stabilizing in July of 2009.  Chile shows a similar picture, as does Mexico.  
In fact, such drastic drops and the following stabilizations can also be seen 
for most of the other countries in the region.11 
Data from the Economic Commission of Latin American countries show 
trade falling 31% from the first half of 2008 to the first half of 2009.12  
Commodity prices decreased by 29% in the same time period, which affects 
Latin America’s export market.13  That drop in exports is comparable to the 
drop back in the 1930s.14  Projections of volume of trade reduction indicate a 
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decrease of 13% in 2009, which is comparable to the time period from 1937 
to 1939.15 
Another aspect related to the implications of the financial crisis in Latin 
America is FDI.  FDI plays a key role in Latin America because it provides 
capital and technology to countries that otherwise would not have it.  
Projections for FDI are not good.  FDI is expected to decrease significantly 
in 2009, but start to recover slowly in 2010.  However, it is expected that 
FDI will  recover to 2008 levels in 2011. 
A recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s 
World Investment Report asked international corporations what their 
investment plans for 2009 were, and 58% answered that they are expecting 
to decrease their investment in all of their countries. 16  Therefore, the 
projections are not good.  For Latin America a lot of FDI took place before 
the financial crisis.  Now, however, the effects are starting to show.  There 
was a drastic drop of 42% from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter 
of 2009.17  Although the drop was drastic, the experience of Latin American 
countries with FDI during the crisis has been quite heterogeneous.  For some 
countries there was an increase in FDI, but for other countries there was a 
decrease. 
Remittances, money that immigrants send from abroad to their home 
regions, are another important indicator.  Remittances have grown 
significantly for many years in the region, and Mexico is one of the 
countries that receives the most remittances.  In 2009, however, there is 
expected to be a decline in remittances of about 11%.18  This fall in 
remittances will bring them back to the level of remittances in 2006.  This 
drop in remittances is expected because there is more unemployment in the 
United States, where Latin American immigrants have been hit harder and 
they are less able to send money back home.  The average amount of money 
sent back was $241, but is now about $230.19 
There is something called the reverse remittances phenomena that has 
not been around until now.  Immigrants in the United States that used to 
support their families back home are now unemployed.  Now, they need 
their relatives back home to help them.  There is some data showing in some 
cities in Mexico that the net transfer is negative; more money going out than 
coming in, which is a new phenomenon in Latin America.20 
II.  LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Latin American countries responded differently to the crisis than other 
developed countries did.  The first difference is that the crisis did not 
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originate in Latin America.  They are being affected by something external, 
not internal, so they are taking a different approach.  Something important to 
note is that Latin American countries went through important reforms during 
the 1990s, which improved their ability to face a crisis.  They are in much 
better shape than they were before the reforms. 
Just like the United States, many Latin American countries used fiscal 
stimulus through greater government spending to address the crisis.  Because 
of the reforms they implemented in the 1990s, which forced governments to 
be more fiscally responsible, many Latin American countries had more room 
to maneuver and to implement these fiscal policies.  In previous crises, some 
Latin American countries did not have the luxury to do that.  They actually 
had to decrease government spending during a recession. 
Another important policy measure was the use of an expansionary 
monetary policy.  In January of 2009, Mexico decreased its benchmark 
interest rate by half a point to 7.75 points.21  That was actually its first cut in 
the interest rate since 2006.  That is a substantial shift in policy, caused by 
the financial crisis.  Many other countries in the region had to use an 
expansionary monetary policy as well. 
Finally, Latin American governments have provided assistance to 
financial institutions, but their approach has been different than the approach 
taken by the United States because the banking sectors in Latin American 
countries did not have the toxic assets that banks in the United States did.  
There was, however, some decrease in credit, to which Latin American 
governments have responded.  The development bank of Brazil started 
purchasing shares from banks, and the development bank of Mexico, 
Nacional Financiera, started giving credits to small and intermediate 
enterprises.22 
There are some interesting cases worth noting when discussing lessons 
and challenges for the region.  Brazil, for instance, is a leader in the region.  
It has been affected by the crisis, but is expecting to recover faster than any 
other country in the region.  One of the reasons Brazil has been very 
successful is that it has a very diversified export sector in terms of products 
and regions.  Another good thing about Brazil is that it has been able to 
achieve macroeconomic stability.  Brazil faced some trouble during the 
1980s and 1990s, but was able to implement some reforms that allow it to 
control inflation and be fiscally responsible.  In 2000, Brazil passed the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law, which forces the government to set a fiscal target 
for government expenditures, revenue, and debts, and then stick to it.23 
Mexico is a different story.  There is a saying that when the U.S. 
sneezes, Mexico catches a cold.  The current situation is a bit worse than a 
cold because the Mexican economy is very dependent on exports to the 
United States.  Other factors affect Mexico’s economy as well.  There are 
still major problems with the drug cartels, and in May, the H1N1 flu had a 
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negative effect.24  The recession in the United States, however, is definitely 
the major reason why Mexico caught not just a cold, but bronchitis. 
Mexico is an interesting case because after it faced the Peso Crisis in 
1994, Mexico implemented reforms that encourage more fiscal 
responsibility, including having a reliable and capable central bank.25  Even 
though Mexico is in trouble, it has been able to use fiscal stimulus.  It is 
surviving the crisis in much better shape than it would have without the 
reforms.  In one sense, Mexico learned its lesson in the 1990s.  Mexico has a 
relatively healthy banking system that was not exposed to toxic assets.  Also, 
it has large reserves of foreign currency, which put it in a much better 
position than before. 
Chile has also been implementing significant reforms.  It has actually 
done an excellent job in macro-management.  This is because Chile created 
stabilization funds.26  During the 2000s there was a significant increase in 
the price of copper and Chile received a huge windfall.  Instead of wasting 
that money, it put it away and saved it.  When it needed to implement fiscal 
stimulus, it had the stabilization funds to draw from.  Chile took the windfall 
profits from the state-owned copper company CODELCO, and put it away 
and saved it abroad in bonds.  Chile is now considering buying foreign stock 
with its funds.  Chile’s finance minister offered the following financial 
philosophy: Chile will spend what is permanent and save what is transitory.  
In other words, Chile will spend what it needs to spend, but whatever is 
extra, Chile will save because Chile is going to need it later.  This policy 
seems to be working very well for Chile. 
III.  LESSONS AND CHALLENGES FOR LATIN AMERICA 
 
A commonality of these countries is that they have implemented 
effective policies in a timely manner.  This is a plus when looking at the 
financial crisis.  There are lessons from the Latin American experience that 
can be applied to the future.  The first one is that Latin American countries 
realize that it pays to be fiscally cautious.  Latin American countries went 
through significant reforms in the 1990s that allowed governments to spend 
money more wisely, and provided them with reserves that gave them some 
security during the financial crisis.  For the region in general, government 
debt as a percentage of GDP has decreased significantly.27  They are in a 
better position, because now that they need to increase government 
spending, they have room to borrow. 
Another important fact for Latin American countries is that central 
banks and improvements to financial institutions played a key role in 
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allowing these countries to be resilient in the financial crisis.  In general, 
central bank performance across Latin America has been solid; many of the 
countries have gone from having inflation rates in the triple digits to 
inflation rates in the single digits.  Lower inflation gives them more room to 
work with monetary policy.  They can use expansionary monetary policy 
without causing significant inflationary pressures.  Also, the improvement of 
financial institutions has been important.  There has been a significant 
increase of credit, as well as financial regulation and supervision.  This has 
allowed the financial system to remain relatively healthy during the financial 
crisis. 
The next lesson is very important.  Latin American countries after their 
reforms of the 1990s were able to build up the credibility of their 
institutions.  Countries did not panic when the financial crisis hit.  Even 
when the economic situation was poor, Latin American countries could 
pursue stabilization policies.  The governments have more control, and the 
central banks can monitor inflation carefully. 
The last lesson is that countries should not be afraid to ask for 
international help.  During the financial crisis, many Latin American central 
banks worked with the Federal Reserve to insure that they would have 
enough foreign currency reserves.28  Cooperation is very important.  Until 
recently, Latin American countries were very reluctant to get help from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  In the 1990s, the IMF gave them loans, 
but attached stringent conditions.  The IMF eventually changed that 
approach.  It created a flexible credit line in the midst of the financial crisis.  
There is no stigma or conditions attached to it.  Therefore countries can tap 
into it and without worrying about damage to their reputations.  Mexico took 
advantage of this credit line in May of 2009, which helped it stabilize its 
economy.29  Therefore, more Latin American countries should look into 
tapping that resource.  The World Bank and the Inter-American Bank are 
also increasing funds available to deal with the financial crisis.30 
There are several challenges that Latin American countries are likely to 
face in the future.  The first challenge for policy makers in the region is that 
Latin America’s fate depends on the recovery of developed countries.  Latin 
American countries can use fiscal stimulus, but that can only go so far.  
Their economies depend significantly on their export sector, primarily the 
export of commodities.  Global demand needs to pick up so that commodity 
prices rise, which will support the export sector in Latin America.  Each 
country can implement its own policies, but in reality global demand is 
going to play a key role in allowing them to recover.  If global demand does 
not recover quickly, then governments will face some restrictions with their 
expansionary fiscal policies because they will have fewer revenues to tap 
into it.  They will eventually run out of the extra room that they have now. 
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Next, policy makers in the region may find it difficult to be fiscally 
responsible in the midst of a financial crisis if unemployment continues to 
increase.  Latin American policy makers should ensure fiscal sustainability 
and solvency.  If policies in Latin American countries start being perceived 
as unsustainable, then there is going to be capital flight and less investment.  
This would be a shame because there have been significant improvements in 
macroeconomic stability during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Another reason that it might be more difficult for Latin American 
countries to be fiscally responsible is that many Latin American countries 
have very small tax bases.  In order to ensure that they remain fiscally 
responsible and fiscally solvent, they should implement tax reforms that 
improve their tax systems.  It has been suggested by some that they create an 
independent agency to monitor government spending and the fiscal stimulus 
to make sure that solvency is maintained.31  Other Latin American countries 
should consider something similar to the Brazilian Fiscal Responsibility Act, 
as well as stabilization funds similar to Chile’s. 
Finally, it is important for policy makers to keep in mind that they are 
dealing with Latin America.  While small in comparison to previous crises, 
the current crisis is still a crisis.  Latin America has a long history of 
instability, poverty, and inequality.  According to the World Bank, poverty is 
around 33%.32  The financial crisis may increase poverty by 15%.  That 
could create some instability.  There is some political instability rising up, so 
Latin American countries must make certain to maintain a stable 
environment by continuing the process of democratization and strengthening 
institutions that promote democracy.  They need to be especially careful that 
social spending is targeted at the population at risk of falling into poverty.  
Latin American countries need to make sure that social spending is targeted 
in the right way. 
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